About F.A.C.E. in the Supreme Court: The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in Light of Lopez by Kampourakis, Anna & Tarr, Robin C.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 11 
Issue 1 Volume 11, Fall 1995, Issue 1 Article 10 
September 1995 
About F.A.C.E. in the Supreme Court: The Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act in Light of Lopez 
Anna Kampourakis 
Robin C. Tarr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Kampourakis, Anna and Tarr, Robin C. (1995) "About F.A.C.E. in the Supreme Court: The Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act in Light of Lopez," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 
11 : Iss. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol11/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ABOUT F.C.E. IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC
ENTRANCES ACT IN LIGHT OF LOPEZ
The United States Constitution is the cornerstone of democratic
principles in our country.1 Since its adoption, it has provided the
balance between societal needs and individual rights.2 For more
than fifty years, the Commerce Clause has been instrumental in
effecting that balance.3 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, recently gave that clause a narrow reading.4 As a result, civil
liberty, the essence of our creed as a democratic nation, is in jeop-
ardy.' Although the arduous struggle to identify and protect indi-
vidual liberties has achieved some success,6 much remains to be
accomplished.7 The present United States Supreme Court has
1 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 389 (1978) (stating that decla-
ration of principles in Constitution were "to provide the cornerstone of the new nation");
Flowers v. Warden, 677 F. Supp. 1275, 1276 (D. Conn 1988) (describing Constitution as
"cornerstone of the exaltation of individual liberty"); Raoul Berger, A Lawyer Lectures a
Judge, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 851, 852 (1995) (describing Constitution as a "set of
principles... which, like a cornerstone, does not change").
2 See Lawrence S. Lustberg, Limiting Individual Choice in Education: The QEA and
Inter-District Regionalization, 154 N.J.L. 20 (1993) (stating that "[t]he same conflict be-
tween individual rights and societal needs pervades our federal constitutional jurispru-
dence"); see also City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) (balancing state's
interest "to preserve the appearance and custom valued by the Quarters residents" with
individual's economic rights); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969) (balancing student's free speech right with school system's interest in
avoiding "substantial disruption" of educational environment).
3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (permitting
congressional regulation of labor under Commerce Clause authority); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (authorizing congressional regulation of coal workers'
hours and wages).
4 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995) (striking down legislation prohib-
iting gun possession in school zones as beyond congressional commerce power).
5 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Constitutional Perils-Real and Otherwise, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1002, 1003 (book review) (elaborating on uncertain status of American civil liberties);
see id. at 1011 (expressing concerns that existence of conservative Supreme Court and Con-
gress "exacerbates the dangers to individual liberties").
6 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(e) (1988) (using Commerce
Clause to remedy perceived moral wrong by allowing federal prohibition of employment
discrimination based on individual's "race, color, religion, sex or national origin"); see also
Nichol, supra note 5, at 1002 (indicating that by any measure civil liberties protection has
undergone "major expansion").
7 See Nichol, supra note 5, at 1002 (stating civil liberties are not "static" and new
problems arise regularly); see also MICHAEL J. ZMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLoYMENT DIsCRnMINATION 76 (3d ed. 1994) (stating unemployment among black Ameri-
cans is twice that of white Americans despite 30 years since enactment of Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
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placed obstructions in the path of future civil rights legislation 8
and threatens to reverse the trend toward expanded civil liberties
established by the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren.9
Since the late 19th century, Congress has attempted to use dif-
ferent constitutional clauses to protect individual liberties with
varying degrees of success. 10 The post-Civil War adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment held great promise as an instrument to
secure individual liberty." The Equal Protection Clause was
viewed as a potential source of congressional power to enact legis-
lation that would protect civil liberties.' 2 It became evident, how-
8 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (holding that
federal affirmative action programs are required to pass strict judicial scrutiny); Nichol,
supra note 5, at 1011 (discussing that Burger Court "produced a strong activist record with-
out promoting a clear vision of the role of the Supreme Court in protecting human rights");
see also William Eskeridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 680 (1990) (discussing Rehnquist Court's possible
obstructive bent in civil liberties arena); Reconstructing Civil Rights, N.Y. TnwEs, Feb. 12,
1990, at A20 (criticizing Rehnquist Court's narrow reading of federal civil rights
legislation).
9 See, e.g., Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1267,
1268 (1992) (noting some commentators' fear that Rehnquist Court will turn clock back to
days of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)), in matters of discrimination); see also
Derrick Bell, Forward: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REv. 597, 598 (1991) (voicing
concerns that present conservative Supreme Court might well declare Civil Rights Act of
1964 unconstitutional); James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The
Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VA~M. L. REv. 1049, 1072 (1989) (stating appoint-
ment of Justice Kennedy "suggests that the Rehnquist Court may, as a revisionist forum,
reverse many civil rights advances of the past generation"). But see STANLEY H. FRIEDEL-
BAUM, THE REHNQUIST COURT: IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 145 (1994) (com-
menting that Rehnquist Court may be headed in direction of moderate conservatism).
10 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (holding constitutional con-
gressional use of spending power to allocate highway funds to states based on their legal
drinking age); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (holding that Com-
merce Clause authorized Congress to prohibit private entities from discrimination in res-
taurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (deter-
mining that Commerce Clause authorized Congress to prohibit private entities from
discrimination in public accommodat'ons); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44
(1922) (holding invalid punitive "tax" passed by Congress on revenues derived in part from
industrial child labor); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(e) (1988)
(using Commerce Clause to prohibit employment discrimination); Bruce Ackerman, Consti-
tutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 493 (1989) (characterizing Bailey
decision as exemplar of Lochner era jurisprudence).
11 See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335. Congress passed the Act, rely-
ing on the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Act prohibited discrimination
against individuals on the basis of race and applied to the conduct of private individuals.
Id. at 336.
12 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-601 (1990) (upholding
federal affirmative action program as constitutional under Equal Protection Clause), over-
ruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (holding that all
race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 471 (1989) (holding that Equal Protection Clause does not authorize
city's use of race-based quotas in awarding construction contracts where city has not
demonstrated compelling government interest).
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ever, that the Equal Protection Clause, standing alone, could not
provide the necessary justification for this type of federal regula-
tion.13 Consequently, Congress pursued other avenues as author-
ity for its legislation. 14
The Commerce Clause 15 became an effective vehicle for the pas-
sage of civil rights legislation. 16 The recent trend in the Supreme
Court,' 7 however, has cast doubt on the utility of the Commerce
Clause in this area.' 8
This departure from the traditionally broad interpretation of
the Commerce Clause may leave Congress without an essential
13 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 24-26 (1883) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment applied only to state action, related only to slavery and involuntary servitude,
and would not authorize congressional regulation of discriminatory practices in public ac-
commodations); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (holding that strict
scrutiny standard of review is applicable to race-based classifications).
14 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (relying on Commerce Clause
to enact civil liberties legislation); S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2366-67 (discussing Civil Rights Cases and failure of Civil
Rights Act of 1875 to pass judicial review under Equal Protection Clause and noting that
1875 Act might well have passed had Congress relied upon Commerce Clause); see also The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 (same).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to "regulate Commerce with For-
eign Nations, and among the Several States, and with the Indian tribes").
16 See S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2368-77 (indicating that Civil Rights Act of 1964
applies to public places engaged in interstate commerce or where patrons were interstate
travelers); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (holding constitu-
tional federal prohibition of discrimination in restaurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding constitutional federal prohibition of dis-
crimination in public accommodations).
17 See, e.g., FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that while author generally avoids
blanket characterizations of Court, he is compelled to classify Rehnquist Court as conserva-
tive); Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial "Conservatism", N.Y. L.J., June 21, 1995, at 2 (dis-
cussing present conservative Supreme Court); Lewis J. Liman, The Lawyer's Bookshelf,
N.Y. L.J. June 30, 1995, at 2 (book review) (criticizing Rehnquist Court's "stingy interpre-
tation" of civil rights statutes); see also Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unful-
filled Aspirations: The Court Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 AIB. L.
lEv. 1111, 1111-13 (1994) (discussing that through appointment of conservative justices,
Presidents Reagan and Bush hoped to change direction in which Court seemed headed,
particularly in area of civil rights); cf GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUrMONAL LAW 122-24 (12th
ed. 1991) (discussing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court packing plan). Roosevelt's
court packing efforts differed from those of Presidents Reagan and Bush in that Roosevelt
attempted to change the total number of Justices who sat on the Supreme Court in order to
ensure passage of his New Deal legislation. Id. Reagan and Bush, on the other hand, fo-
cused on the political leanings of Supreme Court appointees. Smith, supra, at 1113.
18 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995) (holding that Commerce
Clause will not support legislation aimed at providing safe educational environment in
public schools); see also Gershman, supra note 17, at 2 (indicating that recent Court deci-
sions "may have uprooted nearly 60 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence"). See gener-
ally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Judicial Activism in Constitutional Juris-
prudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 629, 633-34 (1990) (discussing extremely conservative trend in
Supreme Court); Charles J. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act: Legislative Over-Reaching or Judicial Nit.Picking?, 99 EDUC. L. RP. 11,
22 (1995) (discussing that while Lopez decision will not have material impact on presence
of guns in schools, it may have impact on unrelated federal legislation).
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tool to preserve individual liberties. 19 The purpose of this Note is
to explore the prospects for future civil liberties legislation en-
acted under the authority of the Commerce Clause. Part One of
this Note traces the evolution of the Commerce Clause and its in-
terpretation in the courts with regard to social welfare, particu-
larly civil liberties. It also explores the opposing views present
within two philosophies which lie at the heart of the Commerce
Clause debate, federalism and interpretivism. Part Two discusses
the recent trend of the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by the
Court's narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause in United
States v. Lopez.2 ° Part Three addresses the effect of the Court's
stance on recent legislation passed under the Commerce Clause.
Particular attention will be paid to the future of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"). 21 Part Four sug-
gests alternative constitutional authority for the enactment of
FACE. The narrow interpretation given the Commerce Clause in
Lopez suggests that FACE may not survive a challenge to its con-
stitutionality under that clause. The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, may provide Congress with an alternative constitutional
justification to sustain the Act.
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Historical Background
The Framers of the Constitution granted Congress certain enu-
merated powers, including the power to regulate interstate com-
merce. 2 In Federalist Paper No. 11,23 Alexander Hamilton opined
19 See Bell, supra note 9, at 598 (stating that absent developments reversing current
conservative trend, Civil Rights Act of 1964 in jeopardy); David M. Burke, The "Presump-
tion of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal Combination for Indi-
vidual Liberty, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 73, 74-75 (1994) (discussing debate regarding
"Rehnquist Court's respect for an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis" and its nega-
tive effect on safeguarding of individual liberty). See generally John E. Nowak, Attacking
the Judicial Protection of Minority Rights: The History Ploy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 608, 609
(1986) (reviewing RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INsUTaY" IN OuR
TamE (1984)).
20 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995).
21 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress has authority "[tlo regulate Com-
merce"); see also David S. Gehrig, Note, The Gun-Free School Zones Act: The Shootout Over
Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism, 22 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 179,
180 (1994) (commenting that Framers intended commerce power to be "specific [and] nar-
row" but subsequent interpretation has expanded it).
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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that commerce was synonymous with "trade and navigation."24 He
suggested that a broad application of the Commerce Clause was
necessary to protect matters affecting trade.25 He also thought
that it was in the best interests of the entire nation to be competi-
tive in foreign markets.26 In Gibbons v. Ogden,27 decided in 1824,
the Supreme Court offered an even broader reading of the clause
than that espoused by Hamilton.28 In Gibbons, the Court deter-
mined that the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to regulate
any activity that affected more than one state.29
For nearly a century after Gibbons, the Court's decisions dealt
with the limits placed on state regulation of commerce matters
and did not discuss the scope of Congress' power under the
clause.3 0 For example, certain activities, such as mining,3 ' produc-
tion,32 and manufacturing,33 were exempt from congressional reg-
ulatory legislation. This changed with the advent of President
24 Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1389 (1987) (construing Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 11 to equate commerce
with trade and navigation, linking discussion of commerce power with United States' need
for navy to protect United States interests in international commerce).
25 See TmE FEDERALIST No. 11, supra note 23, at 85 (discussing meaning of Commerce
Clause).
26 See id.
27 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1824) (holding that one state could not grant steamboat
monopoly at expense of another state).
28 Id. The Court's broad construction of the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power
to regulate activities "affect[ing] the States generally." Id. at 195. See Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (stating that Gibbons gave Commerce Clause "breadth never yet
exceeded"); see also Russo, supra note 18, at 22 (discussing Gibbons' recognition of "far-
reaching extent and accompanying limitations" of Commerce Clause).
29 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194. The Gibbons Court also recognized that Congress's con-
stitutional power to regulate commerce "among the several States" extends to activities
within the interior of a state as well. Id. It seemed that the Court only excluded regulation
of "completely internal" activities from this broad delegation of power. Id.
30 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that manu-
facture was distinct from "commerce"); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1888) (holding
that prohibiting manufacture of liquor was within state's power); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 568 (1853) (holding that state created steamboat monopoly did not infringe on
Congress's commerce power). But see The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 350-51
(1914) (illustrating Supreme Court's slow departure from restrictive view of Knight by per-
mitting regulation of intrastate rail rates).
31 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S 238, 303-04 (1936) (finding that regulation of
coal prices and employee wages in bituminous coal industry was beyond congressional
Commerce Clause authority).
32 Id. The Carter Court found that provisions in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935 regarding prices, wages and working conditions, fell within "production" which was
deemed a local activity and subject to state, not federal regulation. Id.; see also Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-77 (1918) (holding that federal laws attempting to regulate
child labor were unconstitutional because "making of goods" was not considered part of
commerce), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
33 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that manufactur-
ing was distinct from "commerce").
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "New Deal" legislation and the
Court's validation of congressional ability to regulate activities be-
yond those affecting traditional areas of commerce.34 In 1937, the
Court recognized Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation affecting intrastate activities with a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.35 Four years later,
the Court again expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause in
United States v. Darby.31 In Darby, the Court upheld the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938,37 explaining that Congress was em-
powered by the Commerce Clause to enact legislation which had a
rational relation to a legitimate government interest.38 A few
months after Darby, the Court further expanded the scope of the
clause when it held that the intrastate activities of an individual
citizen could be constitutionally regulated when the cumulative
effect of such activities would affect interstate commerce.39
The New Deal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause,
and the Court's affirmation of it, provided Congress with the nec-
essary foundation for the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
34 See Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor
Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REv. 291-315-16 (1994) (describing change in 1937
Supreme Court from consistently invalidating Commerce Clause legislation to consistently
validating it); Larry E. Gee, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the No-
tion of Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress's Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST.
MARY's L.J. 151, 164-65 (1995) (discussing New Deal social legislation and how for first
time Congress, "regulated varied facets of everyday life under the guise of the Commerce
Clause"); Alan R. Greenspan, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A
Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. Rsv. 1019, 1028 (1988) (stating that after
"nullifying" several New Deal efforts, Supreme Court reversed its trend and sustained use
of Commerce Power to regulate national economy).
35 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The NLRB Court found
the National Labor Relations Act to be a permissible and constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 49. But see Darby, 312 U.S. at 118
(holding that Commerce Clause legislation need only show that regulated activity "affects"
commerce).
36 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (holding regulation of labor within Congress's Commerce
Clause power and overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) which held that
pre-New Deal legislation regulating child labor was not within Congress's Commerce
Clause power).
37 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
38 Darby, 312 U.S. at 123; see United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942) (stating commerce power is not limited to regulation of commerce between states but
extends to intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce when regulation of activities
is appropriate means to legitimate end).
39 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1942) (holding that Congress had authority
under Commerce Clause to regulate wheat production for individual consumption); see Pe-
rez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52, 156-57 (1971) (relying on Wickard to uphold
federal criminal statute enacted under Commerce Clause).
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1964.40 The failure of earlier civil rights legislation such as the
Civil Rights Act of 187541 to pass constitutional muster under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment necessi-
tated reliance on Congress's Commerce Clause authority.42 The
post-Civil War amendments, under which the earlier legislation
was enacted, were interpreted by the courts43 as intending to
place the newly-freed slaves on equal footing with other male citi-
zens.44 Subsequent case law proved that the aim of the Amend-
ments was not to protect the civil liberties of every individual in
every circumstance. 45 However, because the Civil Rights Cases
46
intimated that the Commerce Clause might provide the necessary
congressional authority to sustain a civil rights act,47 Congress re-
lied upon this clause when it enacted the 1964 Act.48
40 29 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(9) (1988); see S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2367 (discussing
moral reasons for passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964). The report indicates Congress's
belief that a moral need for legislation coupled with some connection to interstate com-
merce provided sufficient authority for the Act's passage. Id. New Deal legislation encom-
passed social and moral goals in addition to the obvious economic purposes. Id.; see also
Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to
Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 Mn. L. REV. 132, 182 n.255 (1995).
41 ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
42 S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2367; see H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2411 (noting congressional reliance on Com-
merce Clause in passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Thirteenth Amendment states "[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States .... "Id. U.S. CONST amend.
XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[nlo state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. U.S. CONST.
amend. XV. The Fifteenth Amendment states that "[tihe right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Id.
44 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-71 (1873) (adopting narrow in-
terpretation of post-Civil War amendment protection to include only newly emancipated
slaves); id. at 81 (expressing doubt that any action other than discrimination against
blacks would ever fall under provisions of Fourteenth Amendment); see also Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (stating that Court's "initial view" of Four-
teenth Amendment was that it provided freedom for "slave race"). But see Michael J. Mar-
man, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759, 772 (1992) (criticizing Ackerman's theory
that Slaughter-House Cases would have been more appropriately decided if Court used
egalitarian interpretation of post Civil War Amendments). Ackerman suggested that this
view was more consistent with the "flounding principle of federalism." Id.
45 Slaughter-House Cases, 3 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9
(1883).
46 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 (1883) (stating that although 1875 civil
rights legislation was not authorized under Fourteenth Amendment, Commerce Clause
may have provided necessary authority to sustain such legislation).
48 S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2367.
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The use of the Commerce Clause proved prudent, as evidenced
by the decisions in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States49
and Katzenbach v. McClung.5" Whereas the Equal Protection
Clause had not supported legislation prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations, 6 ' the use of the Commerce Clause was
successful.52 In Heart of Atlanta, the Court held that Congress
was required to show only that a rational basis existed for finding
that the proscribed activity affected interstate commerce and that
the means used to remedy it was "reasonable and appropriate."53
In McClung, the companion case to Heart of Atlanta, the Court
held that a congressional prohibition against discrimination in
restaurants was warranted because Congress had a rational basis
for finding that such discrimination affected interstate
commerce.
54
In 1971, the Supreme Court further broadened congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause when it decided Perez v.
United States.55 In Perez, the Court upheld congressional regula-
tion of criminal activity 6 as consistent with the Commerce Clause
49 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964).
50 379 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1964).
51 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 24-26 (1883) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment did not provide authority to regulate discriminatory practices in public accom-
modations); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-71 (1873) (stating that post-
Civil War Amendments were intended to protect only newly-freed slaves); see also Anthony
B. Ching, Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New York v. United
States and the Tenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 99, 136 (1995) (discussing narrow
interpretation given to Fourteenth Amendment in The Civil Rights Cases and "Court's re-
luctance to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to non-racial discrimination").
52 See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258
(finding Commerce Clause authorizes federal legislation forbidding discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations); McClung, 379 U.S. at 299 (finding Commerce Clause authorizes fed-
eral legislation forbidding discrimination in restaurants).
53 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258 (upholding congressional use of Commerce Clause
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in motels and other public accommodations);
see Gehrig, supra note 22, at 183-86 (commenting on Heart of Atlanta decision and use of
Commerce Clause in area of civil liberties).
54 McClung, 379 U.S. at 299. The Congressional Record is "replete with testimony of the
burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination in restaurants." Id. The
evidence was substantial enough in the eyes of the Court to support the use of the Com-
merce Clause as the basis for congressional action in this area. Id. at 299-304. See generally
S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2366-67 (outlining Senate Report on effects of racial
discrimination on interstate commerce).
55 402 U.S. 146, 151-53 (1971) (holding that "extortionate extension of credit" in entirely
local activities was within Congress's Commerce Clause power); see also Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that 'lelven if [an] ... activity be local and though
it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Con-
gress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce").
56 Perez, 402 U.S. at 152-53. The Perez court found that loan sharking affected commerce
and allowed Congress to regulate it. Id.
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and clarified the three main categories under which Congress
could enact legislation. 57 The first category encompassed the mis-
use of "channels of interstate commerce."58 The second category
permitted the "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce."5 9 The third category, and probably the most useful in
the protection of civil liberties, permitted regulation of those activ-
ities "affecting commerce."60
Ten years later, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Ass'n,6' the Court found that environmental concerns fell
within the third category as "affecting commerce" and upheld the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.62 Justice
William H. Rehnquist, in his concurrence, agreed that surface
"163 hmining fell within the bounds of "affecting commerce, but he
argued that the appropriate standard of review was whether the
activity "substantially" affected commerce. 64 This concurrence
foreshadowed the Court's recent decision in United States v. Lo-
pez, 65 which stated the applicable standard to be "substantially
affect[ing]" interstate commerce.6 6 It is important to address the
57 Id.
58 Id. at 150. This included shipment of stolen goods or kidnapped persons. Id.; see Cami-
netti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (holding prohibition of transportation of
women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes within commerce power). See gener-
ally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 602 (1939) (discussing distribution of processed
materials through channels of interstate commerce).
59 Perez, 402 U.S. at 150. This included the protection of the aircraft from destruction.
Id.; see Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 472, 754 (1982) (assert-
ing second category of Commerce Clause power); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981) (same). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1946) (dis-
cussing protection of aircraft from destruction).
60 Perez, 402 U.S. at 150. The Perez Court held Title II of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act constitutional because loan sharking in its "national setting" funded organized
crime and thereby affected interstate commerce. Id. at 156-57; see United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258 (1964) (demonstrating that civil rights legislation was constitutional under Com-
merce Clause if it "affected" interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
297-99 (1964) (applying "affects interstate commerce" standard to uphold legislation). But
see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (opining that case law surrounding Commerce Clause was not
clear with regard to appropriate standard).
61 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
62 Id. at 268, 281-82 (upholding Act by accepting congressional finding that surface min-
ing "affected" commerce and that rational basis existed for regulation).
63 Id. at 312 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
64 Id. Rehnquist voiced his concern that the Court was either misstating or broadening
the applicable standard. Id.
65 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
66 Id. at 1629-30 (holding "rational basis" insufficient to support regulation and requir-
ing showing that activity "substantially affects" commerce).
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philosophical foundations which lie at the heart of the Commerce
Clause debate before analyzing the landmark Lopez decision.
B. The Basis of the Commerce Clause Dispute
The dichotomy in Commerce Clause jurisprudence seems to
stem from differing opinions as to whether the appropriate stan-
dard is "affects commerce" or "substantially affects" commerce.67
More basically, however, the controversy has engendered a dis-
pute between divergent political philosophies surrounding feder-
alism.6" States' rights proponents 69 argue for less federal govern-
mental intervention, while their opponents advocate an activist
federal government.7 ° In addition, a parallel debate concerning
constitutional interpretation permeates the issue.7 ' On the one
67 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (holding that appropriate standard is
"whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce"); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (hold-
ing that Congress had rational basis to find that activity "affected commerce"); NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939) (supporting "affects" standard). But see Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. at 1630 (holding that proper standard is "substantially affects" commerce); United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1994), affld, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (stating
Commerce Clause standard to be substantially affects because merely affects imposes no
limits on Congressional authority); Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 337 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court should adopt standard of substantially affects).
68 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1994)
(discussing judicial limits on imposition of federal statutory schemes on states); William P.
Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 719, 724 (1995) (stating
that there are "very few, if any limits" on areas which federal government may regulate
(citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 520, 550 (1985)).
69 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison), No. 17, at 117-22
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (addressing states' rights advocates' con-
cerns); GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 157 (discussing limitation on Commerce Clause im-
posed by state autonomy concerns); Roy C. MACRIDiS, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLO-
GIES: MOVEMENTS AND REGIMES 89-90 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing conservatives' fear of
strong federal government); 1 JOHN A. GARuATY & ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY, THE AMERICAN
NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1877 269-71 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing 1829
debate between Daniel Webster, proponent of strong federal government and Robert
Hayne, advocate of states' rights).
70 See Epstein, supra note 24, at 1395-99 (discussing state's rights and expansion of fed-
eral power); William N. Eskeridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1364-68 (1994) (claiming
Supreme Court transformed Commerce Clause from limitation on federal power to limita-
tion on state power); James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Consti-
tutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearm Possession, 62 FonDHAM L. REV.
1795, 1826-28 (1994) (expressing concern that federal regulation of firearm possession in
school zones threatens federalism). See generally Justice Byron R. White: A Modern Day
Federalist and a New Deal Liberal, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 322, 342 (discussing overlap
between conservatism and liberalism in Justice White's decisions).
71 See Epstein, supra note 24, at 1387 (stating that "too much water has passed over the
dam" in Commerce Clause jurisprudence to rely on "first principles" in its interpretation);
see also FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 9, at 136-37 (relating that conservative Justice Scalia's
emphasis on original intent has dissuaded more liberal Justices from joining his decisions).
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hand are strict interpretivists who demand absolute fidelity to
constitutional text,72 while on the other hand are non-interpre-
tivists who favor a more flexible interpretational approach.73
These issues pervade the controversy regarding the proper scope
of the Commerce Clause. 4
The degree of permissible federal invasion into states' rights has
been a point of contention since our nation's birth75 and remains
of contemporary significance.76 Many commentators contend that
states are guaranteed the right to conduct their affairs as they see
fit, free from unnecessary federal intervention.77 This view relies
primarily on ideas present at the founding of our country, when
state autonomy was given great deference. 78 Contrary thought
holds that if the federal government can more effectively address
72 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703-
07 (1975).
73 See Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans,
and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 106-07
(1989) (stating that non-interpretivists argue search for original understanding of Consti-
tution is futile and that open-ended constitutional phrases indicate an intent to create liv-
ing document); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers and the Role of
the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 508 (1988) (discussing non-interpretivists belief that
framers did not intend for courts to be bound by their intent).
74 United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 625 n.5 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (quoting FELix
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 66-67 (1937) ("[T]hroughout the Court's history [the
Commerce Clause] has been the chief source of its adjudications regarding federalism."));
see GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 157 (stating that dispute in Commerce Clause challenges is
whether federal regulation impinges on state's autonomy).
75 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (expressing concern that
regulation of activities "indirect and remote" to commerce would "effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local," investing national government
with authority beyond that justifiable in federal system). See generally THE FEDERALIST
PAPER No. 45 (James Madison) (advocating strong federal government); FRIEDELBAUM,
supra note 9, at 149-50 (discussing Rehnquist's preference for state autonomy and pointing
out that Court's recent decisions reflect deference to states' rights particularly in regard to
"personal" issues, such as right to die).
See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990) (deferring to
state courts). FRIEDELBAUM, supra, at 38. Cruzan has been said to have set in motion the
Supreme Court's movement for a revival of state constitutional law. Id.
76 See Klarman, supra note 44, at 783-84. The author points out the division which oc-
curred over the issue of states' rights. Id. Most important along these lines was the intro-
duction of the Bill of Rights by Anti-Federalists (those who supported strong state govern-
ment) and the reaction in Federalist circles. Id. Although the Federalists initially reacted
negatively, they eventually became supporters of the Bill of Rights due to concerns that the
Constitution would not be ratified unless a Bill of Rights was forthcoming. Id.
77 See Kramer, supra note 68, at 1488-93 (discussing federalism and conservatives' views
regarding allocation of power between state and national government); see also Eskeridge
& Ferejohn, supra note 70, at 1360-61 (discussing Framers' goals of dividing national and
state governmental authority).
78 Klarman, supra note 44, at 773-74 (commenting on "Founders' commitment to state
sovereignty"); see Kramer, supra note 68, at 1515 (discussing Founders' attempts to estab-
lish political system which limited federal power).
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an issue than state legislation, federal policy should prevail.79
This line of thinking proposes that the federal government is often
in a better position to make sound decisions regarding issues of
national concern because of its broader perspective and greater
resources.8 0 It follows that the opposing approach fosters an inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause which restricts congressional
authority, believing that problems are solved best on a local level,
even when they are national in scope.81 Comparatively, those who
advocate a broader reading of Congress's commerce power8 2 jus-
tify congressional reliance on the Commerce Clause when the fed-
eral government can be more effective than individual states in
addressing a given situation." The Commerce Clause, in their
view, provides the means to remedy problems that are national in
scope.84
Issues regarding constitutional interpretation overlap the
states' rights dispute.8" Interpretivists advocate strict constitu-
tional interpretation through reliance on the Framers' intent.8 6
Antithetically, non-interpretivists generally adhere to the idea of
a Constitution which is interpreted to address changing societal
79 See FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 9, at 21-23 (discussing belief that because local govern-
ment is more attuned to nature of local problems it is more competent to act in resolving
those problems).
80 Id. at 7-15.
81 See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMEIcAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINs AND DEVELOP-
mENT 95 (7th ed. 1991). At the Constitutional Convention, southerners were very concerned
that northerners would use the commerce power to impose unwanted federal regulation on
southern states. Id. To remedy this potential problem, southerners proposed that all Com-
merce Clause legislation could only be passed by at least a two-thirds vote of Congress. Id.
The South eventually conceded to a simple majority vote on commerce legislation in ex-
change for a constitutional prohibition against taxation of imports. Id. See generally MARY
M. WALKER, Ti EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2-10 (1974) (discussing federal versus
state solutions to local problems).
82 See Richard d. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1968-74 (1994)(discussing development of commerce clause jurisprudence and split between conservative
and liberal idealogies).
83 See FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 9, at 21-23 (demonstrating that national government is
sometimes better able to handle certain local situations).
84 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 81, at 416-17 (discussing comparative abilities of state
and federal governments to exercise police power); WALKER, supra note 81, at 6 (stating
that Commerce Clause evolved into great source of congressional power); see also Eskeridge
& Ferejohn, supra note 70, at 1364-65 (discussing application of national and uniform re-
sponses to remedy national problems).
85 See generally Grey, supra note 72, at 709-14 (providing general overview of interpreti-
vism and non-interpretivism).
s6 Id. at 707-10 (describing non-interpretivists' perception of Framers' original intent).
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needs.8 7 In arguing that the Framers' intent is less important
than current needs, this group believes that our founding fathers
could not have envisioned our world as it is today. 8
The present Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has
been labeled a conservative one, having a strong respect for both
states' rights and strict constitutional construction. 9 This Court
has handed down decisions which reflect this view, as evidenced
by the recent decision in Lopez.9 °
II. ANALYSIS OF LOPEZ
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,91 which made the knowing possession of
a firearm within a school zone92 a federal offense. The defendant,
a 12th-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio,
Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed, unloaded .38 caliber
handgun and five bullets. 93 Acting on an anonymous tip, school
authorities confronted the defendant, who was then arrested and
indicted 94 for violation of the Act.9"
87 Id.; see Presser, supra note 73, at 106-07 (discussing non-interpretivists' philosophy
that Constitution was intended as living document to address needs of society); Rotunda,
supra note 73, at 508 (stating non-interpretivists' ideology of a flexible Constitution).
88 See, e.g., New York v. Garcia, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). The Garcia Court commented
that the Framers could not have envisioned the need to address the disposal of nuclear
wastes. Id.; see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 286 (1988). Adjudica-
tion based on original intent analysis results in set, abstract rules that yield unsatisfactory
responses to the nation's collective and individual well-being. Id. One counter argument is
that principles of stability and consistency support a reliance on the framers' intent. Id. at
289-90.
89 See supra notes 9, 17 (demonstrating how present Supreme Court has been labeled
conservative); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995).
Prior to the Adarand decision, the Court's equal protection decisions made a distinction
between state and federal affirmative action legislation, applying strict scrutiny to state
action and only intermediate scrutiny to federal action. Id. at 2100-01. The Adarand Court
eliminated this distinction and held that strict scrutiny applied to all race-based classifica-
tions-a conservative position. Id.
90 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (holding that Commerce Clause
does not authorize federal legislation of activities that do not "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce).
91 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990). The Act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that [he] knows ... is a school zone." Id.
92 § 921(a)(26). The Act defined school zone as: "(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public,
parochial or private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a
public, parochial or private school." Id. A school was defined as "a school which provides
elementary or secondary education under State law." Id.
93 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Lopez is reported to have brought the weapon to school in
order to sell it to another student who planned to use it in a gang war. Id.
94 Id. Lopez was originally charged with violating a state statute. Id. The state charges
were dropped when federal charges were filed. Id.
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Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
Act was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.96
Lopez claimed that the regulation of schools could not be deemed
necessary to further any of Congress's enumerated powers under
the Constitution.9 The United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas denied the motion, concluding that the Act
was well within Congress's Commerce Clause authority.98 Lopez
was thereafter tried, convicted, and sentenced. 99
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed Lopez's conviction.' 0 The court held that in passing
the Act, Congress had exceeded its authority granted under the
Commerce Clause. 1 1 The Fifth Circuit cited a series of cases
which used the word "substantial" in formulating the applicable
standard in Commerce Clause interpretation. 0 2 The court relied
on limited portions of prior decisions,'0 3 and held that the regu-
lated activity must "substantially affect" interstate commerce in
95 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (providing procedural history).
96 Id. The sole basis of Lopez's objection rested on Congress's constitutional authority to
enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
97 Brief for Respondent at 25-27, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (No.
93-1260) (arguing that Gun Free School Zones Act unconstitutionally invaded traditional
state authority to regulate school zones because Act is not within commerce power nor any
other authority put forth by Congress), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
98 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
The Court recognized that the commerce power is "the power to ... prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed ... it is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id.
9 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345. The defendant was sentenced to six months in prison to be
followed by two years supervised release. Id.
100 See id. at 1364. The court ruled that the district court erred in convicting Lopez be-
cause the Gun Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional. Id. Congress was found to have
gone beyond the bounds of their Commerce Clause authority. Id.
101 Id. The court thought that the Act represented an impermissible expansion of federal
power which collided with the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Id.
102 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1360-63 (5th Cir. 1993).
103 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1361. The Fifth Circuit relied on Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) which stated that a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce was required
to sustain regulative legislation. Id. In addition, the court of appeals placed great weight on
the remark in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) that "[nleither in here nor
in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities." Id. Fur-
ther, the court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) to support its conclusion that where Congress's findings show that the regulated
activities "substantially affects" interstate commerce, the courts must defer to Congress,
given a rational basis for that finding. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1361. But see Hodel, 452 U.S. at
276. In Hodel, the Court's verbatim statement was "[tihe court must defer to a congres-
sional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational
basis for such a finding." Id.
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order to be a permissible exercise of congressional power. 104 The
Court of Appeals found no rational basis to explain how firearm
possession in a school zone substantially affected commerce." °5
Absent formal findings to the contrary, the court held that the
necessary nexus to interstate commerce was absent, 0 6 and ruled
the Act unconstitutional. 10
7
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision,
adopting much of the same reasoning.10 8 The Court began its
analysis by focusing on the enumerated powers of Congress as au-
thorized by the Constitution. 09 In relying on Federalist Paper No.
45,110 the Court noted that the enumerated powers were "few and
defined" while those powers remaining in State governments were
"numerous and indefinite.""' The majority conceded that modern-
era precedent 1 2 had "greatly expanded" Commerce Clause con-
struction. 113 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, explained that de-
spite existing precedent, there were limits on Commerce Clause
authority, and the Gun-Free School Zones Act fell outside those
limits. 1 14 The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and
held that the applicable standard required that the regulated ac-
104 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366-67 (finding that mere possession of firearm does not substan-
tially affect commerce).
105 Id. at 1367-68.
106 Id.
107 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
108 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist, author
of the concurring opinion in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 312 (1981), wrote the majority opinion. Id.
109 Id. at 1626.
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (discussing "enumerated powers" of
federal government).
111 See CLNTRON RossrrER, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS viii (1961). Although Rehnquist's
majority opinion relied on the restraints on national power delineated in the Federalist
Papers, it should be noted that those works were written primarily to persuade those states
favoring state autonomy that questioned the necessity of a strong federal constitution. Id.
112 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (noting that commerce power ex-
tends to purely local, non-commercial activities when cumulative effect of activity would
impact on interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 100, 119
(1942) (commerce clause power extends to intrastate activities which in "substantial way
interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power"); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (holding commerce clause power extends to intrastate activities which
so affect interstate commerce so as to make regulation appropriate); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding regulation of intrastate activities having
'close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce" constitutional when essential
to interstate commerce regulation).
113 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995).
114 Id.
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tivity must "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 1 15 The
Court acknowledged that legislative findings are not required to
support Commerce Clause legislation, but such findings could es-
tablish a nexus between the regulated activity and interstate com-
merce when one is not apparent. 1 16 Absent such findings, the
Court ruled the Act unconstitutional."
7
Although the Lopez decision purports to comply with prece-
dent,118 in actuality, it relies on cases which do not fully support
its propositions. " 9 As recently as 1981, in Hodel v. Indiana,2 ° the
115 Id. at 1630. The Court maintained that its decision was "consistent with the great
weight" of the pertinent case law. But see Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981)
(holding that regulated activity must affect interstate commerce); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (holding that loan sharking affected commerce and so could be
regulated by Congress); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302-04 (1964) (holding Civil
Rights Act of 1964 constitutional because it affected commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-61 (1964) (using affects commerce standard to prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations); Wrightwood Dairy v. United States, 315 U.S.
110, 119-20 (1941) (holding intrastate milk price regulation constitutional because it af-
fected commerce); United States v, Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (holding federal regula-
tion of labor constitutional because it affected interstate commerce). It would seem from the
foregoing that the "great weight" of authority supported the "affects interstate commerce"
standard rather than that of "substantially affects interstate commerce."
116 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. Although the Lopez Court recognized that formal con-
gressional findings were not required to sustain federal legislation, they commented that
such findings would have been useful in determining whether the required nexus with in-
terstate commerce existed. Id.
117 Id. at 1634. The Court found that possession of a gun is not an economic activity
which substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
118 United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (noting that decision was in ac-
cordance with precedent); see Stephen G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enu-
merated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995)
(stating that Lopez revived doctrine of limited federal government); id. at 828 (proposing
reconciliation of Lopez and Commerce Clause precedent by labeling earlier cases "right on
the facts"); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995) (commenting that Lopez did not upset pre-
cedent); Charles B. Schweitzer, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal Docket:
The Impact of United States v. Lopez, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 71, 97 (1995) (noting that Lopez
"gingerly accepted New Deal precedents"); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutional-
ity of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 291,
292-93 (1994) (stating that established standard is "affects commerce").
119 See Steven Christopher Likes, Commerce Clause: An Utter Disregard for Precedent:
Misconstruing Commerce Clause Precedent in United States v. Lopez, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 811, 841 (1996) (commenting that Lopez decision "ignored precedent" in holding that
commerce power permits congressional regulation of only those economic intrastate activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce); Schweitzer, supra note 118, at 97 (con-
ceding that Lopez changed Commerce Clause precedent by creating more stringent test for
permissible congressional regulation). But see Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV.
674, 731 (1995) (finding it unlikely that subsequent application of Lopez will overturn Com-
merce Clause precedent); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995)
(noting that Court shows no signs of intention to overturn Commerce Clause precedent).
Compare Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (permitting congressional regulation of "activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce") with Hodel, 452 U.S. at 323-24 (per-
mitting congressional regulation where activity affects commerce) and Perez, 402 U.S. at
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Court held that it may invalidate Commerce Clause legislation
"only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or
that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory
means selected and the asserted ends." 121 While the Lopez Court
cited Hodel as support for its decision, the Court relied on the con-
curring opinion of Justice Rehnquist as partial justification for the
"substantially affecting interstate commerce" requirement. 122
Similarly, the Court gave minimal attention to Heart of Atlanta123
and Katzenbach,124 two cases which served as the basis of Ho-
del."'25 These two decisions comprise the cornerstone of modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the area of civil liberties and
are relevant to the Lopez decision.1 26 The Court's interpretation of
the Commerce Clause in Lopez, however, declared the Act an im-
permissible invasion of states' rights. 127 This narrow interpreta-
tion of federal commerce power threatens to invalidate other im-
portant social legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. In particular, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act of 1994 ("FACE")128 may not withstand the heightened judi-
cial scrutiny announced in Lopez.
154 (permitting congressional regulation of activities which affect commerce) and Katzen-
bach, 379 U.S. at 302-04 (finding Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional because discrimi-
nation affected commerce) and Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (holding that labor standards affect
commerce).
120 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
121 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 323-24.
122 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 n.2 (citing concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist in
support of standard requiring activity "substantially" affect interstate commerce).
123 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
124 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
125 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324-25, 329 (1981) (citing Heart of Atlanta and
Katzenbach in establishing its standard).
126 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decisions
in Heart of Atlanta and McClung).
127 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct 1624, 1628 (1995).
128 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). The Act states that whoever:
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimi-
dates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person
because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other
person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health serv-
ices ....
Id.
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III. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT OF 1994
FACE was enacted in response to the increasing violence occur-
ring at entrances to reproductive health services clinics.129 In re-
cent years, the debate between the pro-life and pro-choice activists
has escalated to a war beyond words. 3 ° Providers of reproductive
services have been murdered or seriously injured, and women
seeking such services have been threatened, intimidated and
harassed.' 31 In order to promote public safety and protect the con-
stitutional right to seek reproductive services, Congress found it
not only necessary, but imperative, to enact FACE.' 32
129 H. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699,
703-04 (reporting "more than 1,000 acts of violence" against United States providers of
abortion services from 1977 to 1993 (citing NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF
VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS (1993)). The report detailed at
least 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, two kidnappings, 327 clinic
invasions, and one murder. Id. Further, more than "6,000 clinic blockades and other dis-
ruptions have been reported since 1977." Id. Attorney General Janet Reno testified that
violence associated with reproductive clinics was on the increase and a federal remedy
needed to be provided. Id. at 707; see Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (W.D. La. 1994)
(stating that language of FACE does not support conclusion that Commerce Clause was
used "for the primary purpose of paralyzing the protests of anti-abortionists"). The Cook
court pointed to a "villainous attack" at a reproductive health services clinic that resulted
in murder. Id.
130 See, e.g., Melissa Jaco, Radical Foes of Abortion Test Limits of Protest, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNIrOR, Aug. 4, 1995, at 4 (reporting American Coalition of Life Activist's view that Dr.
David Gunn's 1993 murder was "justifiable homicide"); Ana Puga, Radicalizing Right to
Life: Newcomers Preach Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 26 (documenting in-
crease of anti-abortion movement that condones death threats, bombings, murder and
other violent acts); see also Saul Friedman, Monitoring Militias: Are They Linked to Anti-
Abortion Violence?, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1995, at A15 (reporting that Michigan Militia has
picketed in "full camouflage gear" outside one abortion clinic and indicating that evidence
exists that other "militias" are one driving force behind anti-abortion violence).
131 See H. REP. No. 306, supra note 129, at 704-06; see also Tamar Lewin, Citing Vio-
lence, Abortion Clinics Sue Over Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1995, at A21. Planned
Parenthood has initiated a class action suit against the American Life League, among
others, in an effort to stop the groups' publication of "wanted" posters portraying 13 abor-
tion doctors. Id. Of the 13 doctors, five have been shot at and threatened. Id. Planned
Parenthood maintains that the publication amounts to intimidation within the meaning of
FACE as "individuals who have failed to heed similar threats have been murdered or seri-
ously injured. Id.
132 H. REP. No. 306, supra note 129, at 700. The majority view held that right to abortion
was found in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was, there-
fore, entitled to federal protection. Id. But see id. The dissenting view found that FACE was
not an appropriate federal response to the violence occurring at reproductive services clin-
ics. Id. at 713. The dissenters expressed concern that FACE violated First Amendment
protection of speech. Id. at 719.
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A. Constitutional Authority for FACE
The Commerce Clause provided the primary constitutional
foundation for the enactment of FACE. 133 The House Judiciary
Committee Report and House Conference Report reflect Con-
gress's determination that the obstruction of access to clinic en-
trances affects interstate commerce,13 1 particularly because clinic
employees and medical supplies moved in interstate commerce. 
135
In addition, the reports focus on the fact that women seeking re-
productive services often travel to other states to obtain them. 136
Thus, it is clear that a rational basis existed for the congressional
finding that the regulated activity, violent anti-abortion protests,
affected interstate commerce. 13
7
B. Challenges to FACE
Soon after FACE was enacted, it was challenged in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California on the
grounds that it chilled protestors' freedom of expression and reli-
133 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994) (stating that protestors'
conduct burdens interstate commerce by forcing patients to travel to states where access to
reproductive health services is unobstructed); S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65
(1993) (recognizing that FACE is constitutionally authorized under Commerce Clause be-
cause Congress had "a rational basis" for finding that regulated activity affected com-
merce); id. (noting that pursuant to Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can regulate
activity which is purely local if it has requisite effect on interstate commerce). But see S.
REP. No. 117, supra, at 67-68 (1993) (citing Equal Protection Clause and Section Five of
Fourteenth Amendment as independent basis for Act's passage). See generally Bray v. Al-
exandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759 (holding that § 1985(3) of Public
Health Law did not authorize federal courts to enjoin clinic blockades and illustrating defi-
cit in federal protection of clinic entrances).
134 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 65 (relying on Attorney General Reno's testi-
mony that many patients traveled from out of state); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488, supra note
133, at 724 (discussing burden placed upon women who are forced travel out of state to
clinics which are not obstructed).
135 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 65 (discussing interstate purchase of medical
supplies as affecting commerce); Tribe, supra note 118, at 292-93 (finding it "indisputable"
that protestors' activities affect interstate commerce because activities burden interstate
movement of patients, clinic employees, and medical supplies). But see Jill W. Rose & Chris
Osborn, Face-Ialneutrality: A Free Speech Challenge to the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act, 81 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1539 (1995) (arguing "government's alleged interest" in
protecting interstate commerce not sufficient to allow infringement of free speech).
136 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 65 (reporting Attorney General Reno's re-
marks that women frequently travel interstate to obtain reproductive services); Katherine
A. Hiber, Constitutional Face-off. Testing the Validity of the Freedom of Access, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 143 (1994) (noting that patients seeking reproductive services frequently
travel from out of state, bringing FACE under commerce power).
137 E.g., American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that Commerce Clause provided necessary authority for FACE enactment), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 2538 (U.S. May 12, 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995)
(finding that rational basis existed to sustain FACE legislation under Commerce Clause).
210 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:191
gion ' 1 and that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause author-
ity.' 39 The court held that because FACE proscribed only violent
conduct, it was not violative of freedom of expression. 140 Further,
the court found that because the regulation of the protestors' ac-
tivities affected interstate commerce, FACE did not exceed con-
gressional commerce power.14 1 Subsequently, federal district
courts in Louisiana 42 and Arizona143 decided in favor of the con-
stitutionality of FACE on grounds similar to those found by the
California court.14 4 These three decisions were reached prior to
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez.1 45
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin, however, relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Lopez,' 46 reached a conclusion contrary to those reached
by the district courts of California, Louisiana and Arizona. 47 In
United States v. Wilson,14 the court held that no constitutional
authority for the enactment of FACE existed. 4 9 The court took
the position that Congress had no "inherent power" to protect civil
138 Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 n.1 (S.D. Ca. 1994) (hold-
ing FACE constitutional exercise of congressional authority under Commerce Clause). The
plaintiffs also claimed that FACE violated the Establishment Clause and the Religious
Freedom Act of 1993. Id. at 1426. The court disagreed. Id.
139 Id. at 1431.
140 Id. at 1426-27 (stating that FACE is directed toward conduct rather than expression).
141 Id. at 1431.
142 Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding FACE constitutional
as content-neutral restriction on speech). The petitioners claimed that the Commerce
Clause was a pretextual means employed by Congress to chill the anti-abortionists' First
Amendment rights of expression. Id. at 1010-11. The court disagreed and explained that
the primary purpose of the Act was to ensure public safety and protect individual rights not
to hinder the acts of anti-abortionists. Id.
143 Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 707 (D. Ariz. 1994). FACE was found to be constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause. Id. The court also determined that FACE was not an
impermissible regulation of protected expression. Id. at 702. The court determined that the
statute was narrowly drawn to serve a legitimate state interest, i.e., protecting the rights of
those who seek reproductive services while allowing protestors to express their ideas. Id. at
703.
144 See Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426-27 (deciding FACE
did not violate anti-abortionists' First Amendment rights of expression since regulation
was adopted without reference to speech).
145 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1624 (1995) (decided April 26, 1995); Riely,
860 F. Supp. at 693 (decided August 12, 1994); Cook, 859 F.Supp at 1008 (decided August 5,
1994); Council for Life, 856 F. Supp. at 1422 (decided July 6, 1994).
146 2 F.3d 1342, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1993).
147 See United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 634 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that
Congress did not have authority to pass FACE under Commerce Clause or Fourteenth
Amendment).
148 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
149 Id. at 636. The court held that FACE exceeded the limits of congressional commerce
power. Id.
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liberties absent a specific constitutional provision permitting them
to do so. 150 This court also considered the Equal Protection Clause
as a possible constitutional basis for the legislation, but rejected
the notion, holding that the clause applied only to state action and
could not be used to prohibit the actions of private individuals. 151
More significantly, the court followed the Commerce Clause stan-
dard enunciated in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lopez which re-
quired that the regulated activity substantially affect interstate
commerce. 152 Since the court found that the obstruction of clinic
entrances did not substantially affect interstate commerce,1 53 it
concluded that the Commerce Clause could not be used to support
legislation such as FACE.'
The Wilson court reached its decision one month after the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found FACE
to be constitutional in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno. 155
American Life League was decided prior to the Commerce Clause
standard set forth in the Supreme Court's Lopez decision. Ameri-
can Life League validated the Act as a legitimate exercise of com-
merce power and found that the regulated activity affected inter-
150 Id. (acknowledging that right to abortion was recognized by Supreme Court but dis-
agreeing that fact allowed Congress to enact legislation to protect right). But see H. Rep.
No. 306, supra note 129, at 700 (noting majority view contention that right to abortion
entitled to protection through federal legislation); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that right to privacy existed within "penumbras" of Bill of
Rights). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (holding that constitution-
ally-protected right to privacy encompassed constitutional right to abortion).
151 Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 634-35 (noting that while former Justices Brennan and Clark
had suggested Fourteenth Amendment might be applied to private action, no such applica-
tion had yet occurred). But see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that majority found Fourteenth Amend-
ment applied to private conduct). Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (find-
ing that congressional power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment is broader than judicial
power to do same).
152 Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628. See Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir.
1993) (applying "substantially affects" standard to strike down Gun-Free School Zones
Act).
153 United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 628, 632-33 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675
(7th Cir. 1995). The court found that FACE regulated private conduct which only impacted
interstate commerce as a subsequent trivial chain reaction. Id.
154 Id. The Wilson court made a distinction between commerce legislation that regulated
the conduct of commercial liberties, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did, and legislation that
regulated the conduct of private individuals, as FACE did. Id. The Wilson court determined
that the Commerce Clause did not reach private individuals' conduct and that the conduct
did not substantially affect commerce. Id.
155 47 F.3d 642, 645, 647 (4th Cir.) (holding that Commerce Clause provided necessary
authority for FACE enactment), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 2538 (U.S. May 12, 1995).
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state commerce.' 5 6 Shortly after the Lopez decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Cheffer v.
Reno,'5 7 adopted much of the Commerce Clause reasoning used by
the court in American Life League.'5 8 The Cheffer court deter-
mined that Congress' findings provided a plausible basis for sus-
taining the Act under the "substantially affects" standard pro-
nounced in Lopez.'5 9
C. FACE In Light of Lopez
The controversy has continued beyond the circuits. 160 While the
American Life League was denied its petition for certiorari,' the
denial was reportedly founded on the grounds that FACE did not
infringe upon the anti-abortion protestors' First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and religion. 162 Given the Court's posi-
tion in Lopez, one must wonder how the Court would decide the
issue should certiorari be granted on a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. The Court could find, as the Wilson court did, that the ob-
struction of clinic entrances and the associated violence does not
substantially affect interstate commerce. 163 Were the Court to de-
cide the issue applying this reasoning that it did in Lopez, FACE
may fall.16 4
A strong basis, however, exists for finding that protestors' activ-
ities substantially affect interstate commerce. 165 Of fundamental
156 Id. (following standard set forth by majority opinion in Hodel); see Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981). But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 n.2 (1995)
(referring only to concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Hodel).
157 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
158 Id. at 1520-21.
159 Id. at 1520 (finding interstate movement of patients, doctors, and supplies provided
necessary nexus with interstate commerce).
160 E.g., American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.) (holding FACE
constitutional under Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 2538 (U.S. May 12,
1995).
161 Id.
162 Law Securing Access to Abortion Clinics Left Standing, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 1995, at 1
(reporting that Supreme Court's denial of certiorari merely left standing Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision that FACE did not infringe on protestors' freedom of speech or
religion and noting that no definitive ruling has yet been rendered on Act's
constitutionality).
163 Id.
164 United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 632-33 (1995) (holding that FACE was not
valid exercise of congressional commerce authority).
165 Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding FACE constitutional
under Commerce Clause); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
1995) (same); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1433-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same);
Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (W.D. La. 1994) (same).
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importance is the fact that the provision of reproductive services is
commerce. 166 A significant number of women travel across state
lines to obtain reproductive services. 1- 7 In addition, both clinic
employees and medical supplies used within the clinics move in
interstate commerce. 168 Thus, the protestor's activities have a
negative effect on interstate commerce because they reduce the
flow of these goods and services among states. 169 Further, it is un-
likely that new clinics will open with the threat of violence loom-
ing,170 evincing an even greater negative impact on interstate
commerce.' 17 It is proposed therefore, that the protestors' activi-
166 United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding FACE con-
stitutional under Commerce Clause).
167 See Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (D.
Kan. 1991) (noting that 44% of Women's Health Care Services' patients were from outside
Kansas during given time period and at same time 8-10% of Wichita Family Planning pa-
tients were from another state); see also Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Operation Rescue
Versus a Woman's Right to Choose: A Conflict Without a Federal Remedy, 32 DuQ. L. REV.
709, 715 (1994) (providing statistics that significant number of women travel interstate to
obtain reproductive services); Christopher W. Tomlin, The Reign of Terror: The Judiciary's
Inability to Stop Anti-Abortion Violence Forces Congress Back to the Drawing Board, 18
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 423, 437-38 (1994) (reporting that increased violence has resulted in
significantly decreased number of abortion providers); Tribe, supra note 118, at 292 (stat-
ing that over 80% of United States counties do not have clinics offering abortions); Rori
Rabin, Eviction Allowed, Judge; Landlord May Boot Targeted Abortion Clinic, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 31, 1995, at A3 (reporting New York Supreme Court ruling permitting eviction of abor-
tion doctor tenant whose medical practice attracted abortion protestors and noting that of
320 metropolitan areas in United States, only 90 had abortion providers in 1992, down
from 105 in 1988); Telephone Interview with Donna Lieberman, Attorney and Associate
Director of N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 1995) (commenting that eviction rul-
ing was "inconsistent with the spirit of FACE"); cf Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
299 (1964) (finding that restaurant patrons traveled interstate and reasoning that fewer
restaurants would be in business if racial discrimination was allowed to persist).
168 See generally S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 65 (discussing movement of employ-
ees and medical supplies in interstate commerce); H.R. ComN. REP. No. 488, supra note 133,
at 724 (same). Cf McClung, 379 U.S. at 301-05 (holding restaurant supplies and patrons'
movement in interstate commerce justified regulation under Commerce Clause).
169 See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300 (finding that reduced flow of goods affects interstate
commerce); see also Merritt, supra note 119, at 725 (discussing burden on interstate move-
ment of patients, employees, and medical supplies imposed by protestors' activities).
170 See Tomlin, supra, note 167, at 437-38 (documenting significant decrease in number
of abortion providers); Tribe, supra note 118, at 292 (relating that majority of United States
counties have no abortion providers); Rabin, supra note 167, at A3 (reporting decline in
number of abortion providers between 1988 and 1992); see also Courtland L. Reichman,
Federal Remedies for Abortion Protest: Discordance of First Principles, 44 EMORY L.J. 773,
774 (1995) (noting that protesters' goals include closing clinics and forcing clinics to cease
providing abortion services). See generally Michele R. Moretti, Using Civil RICO to Battle
Anti-Abortion Violence: Is the Last Weapon in the Arsenal the Sword of Damocles?, 25 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1363, 1389-91 (1991) (discussing severe economic harm caused by protester
activity).
171 Cf Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300 (noting that new businesses may refrain from open-
ing in areas where discrimination is prevalent thereby affecting commerce).
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ties meet the Court's requirement that the regulated activity sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 172
Given the recent conservative trend of the Supreme Court with
respect to states' rights 73 and reproductive rights, 74 however,
the prospects for FACE's survival are not bright.1 75 If FACE is
held unconstitutional, it may mean that the Supreme Court will
limit congressional efforts to protect the constitutional right to pri-
vacy in reproductive matters, 76 at least through the Commerce
Clause. 177
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR FACE
If the Commerce Clause fails as sufficient authority to support
the enactment of FACE, it will be necessary to seek alternative
means to uphold the validity of the Act. 178 As Congress noted dur-
172 Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (S.D. Cal. 1994). The court
relied on congressional findings establishing that obstruction of entrances to abortion clin-
ics affected commerce. Id.
173 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2165, at *47
(Mar. 27, 1996) (emphasizing importance of state autonomy in evaluation of federal legisla-
tion's constitutionality); Calabresi, supra note 118, at 752 (discussing Court's return to doc-
trine of enumerated powers and limited federal government); Regan, supra note 119, at 555
(proposing Commerce Clause test that permits federal regulation only where matter cannot
be successfully left to state regulation); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to
Subject States to Lawsuits, N.Y. Tims, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (reporting that Seminole hold-
ing lends credence to view that Lopez signaled the Court's inclination to place greater em-
phasis on states' rights when evaluating federal legislation); see also FRIEDELBAUM, supra
note 9, at 145 (positing that Rehnquist Court may be heading toward "moderate conserva-
tism"); Bell, supra note 9, at 598 (expressing fear that present Court might well invalidate
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
174 See FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade
where he expressed doubt as to whether right to abortion was "fundamental").
175 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding
FACE unconstitutional under both Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses). But see Tele-
phone Interview with assistant to Rep. Charles Schumer (D-Brooklyn) (Nov. 1, 1995) (com-
menting that Rep. Schumer authored FACE under authority of Commerce Clause and reit-
erating that Act is within congressional commerce power).
176 Tomlin, supra note 167, at 437-38 (1994) (commenting that "Supreme Court's slow
but steady retreat from Roe v. Wade" increases, rather than deters, violence).
177 Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 634 (holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause
authority in enacting FACE).
178 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2165, at *23-24
(Mar. 27, 1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state autonomy absent specific
constitutional grant of authority); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995)
(reiterating that Congress's powers extend only to those constitutionally enumerated); see
also S. REP. No. 872, supra note 14, at 2366-67 (recognizing that Civil Rights Act of 1875
might well have passed judicial review had Commerce Clause been relied upon instead of
Equal Protection Clause). Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 257-58 (1964) (permitting regulation of civil rights under congressional commerce
power) with The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-26 (1883) (striking down regulation of
civil rights as beyond congressional authority under Equal Protection Clause).
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ing the passage of FACE, the Fourteenth Amendment may pro-
vide the necessary constitutional authority for the Act. 179
The Fourteenth Amendment requires state action for its appli-
cation. 180 This state action requirement is a threshold issue which
must be overcome in order to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect individual rights against the conduct of non-state ac-
tors.1 8 1 Despite nineteenth-century Supreme Court rulings which
held that the actions of private individuals were not within the
Amendment's coverage, 8 2 more recent authority suggests a
broader construction.18 3
While the Supreme Court has held that a state's "mere acquies-
cence" does not amount to state action,18 4 it has also noted that
the Constitution may impose upon the state a duty to act in cer-
179 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 67-68 (proposing Equal Protection Clause as
alternative basis for sustaining FACE); Tribe, supra note 118, at 295, 298 (suggesting
Equal Protection Clause as viable alternative in sustaining FACE legislation).
180 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989) (re-
quiring state action for Fourteenth Amendment application); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 168 (1978) (reiterating Fourteenth Amendment state action require-
ment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 24-26 (holding state action prerequisite to
Fourteenth Amendment violation); see Dilan A. Esper, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of
State Action, 68 S. CAL. L.R. 663, 677, 708-17 (1995) (discussing divergent theories of Four-
teenth Amendment state action requirement and proposing "middle ground" where "collec-
tive action" by private actors may rise to level of state action when severe right infringe-
ment results).
181 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (striking down California constitu-
tional provision forbidding state from legislatively preventing discrimination and implying
that seemingly neutral state acts may encourage private behavior violative of Fourteenth
Amendment); Kenneth M. Krock, The Constitutionality of Texas Nonjudicial Foreclosure:
Protecting Subordinate Property Interests From Deprivation Without Notice, 32 Hous. L.
REv. 815, 855-58 (1995) (discussing belief that private action may fulfill Fourteenth
Amendment state action requirement when state laws fail to prevent right deprivation).
But see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-26 (finding Fourteenth Amendment inappli-
cable to private conduct).
182 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 25 (holding post-Civil War federal civil
rights legislation invalid under Fourteenth Amendment because it attempted to regulate
private conduct); GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 888 (stating that "private misconduct [is] not
wholly outside congressional reach" under Fourteenth Amendment).
183 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (stating that Congress's power
to enforce Fourteenth Amendment is much broader than judiciary's because of congres-
sional "resourcefulness" and "responsibility"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782
(1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[a] majority of the
members of the Court expresses the view today that [§] 5 empowers Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights,
whether or not State officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in
the conspiracy"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (holding that judicial en-
forcement constituted state action for purposes of equal protection); see also Tribe, supra
note 118, at 296-98 (confirming Congress's authority to regulate purely private conduct
under Fourteenth Amendment when states and municipalities are unable to provide pro-
tection against private acts threatening enjoyment of federal constitutional rights).
'84 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193-94 (1989) (holding failure of State to protect citizen from
violence does not amount to state action).
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tain circumstances.1 5 It is proposed that when the conduct of pri-
vate individuals violates the Fourteenth Amendment and the
state has a duty to prevent the violation but fails to do so, federal
legislative action is appropriate. 8 6 When this situation occurs,
the state action requirement may be met by virtue of the state's
inaction, bringing private conduct within the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment.1 7
Once the state has failed in its duty to protect individual rights,
Congress may, pursuant to the Enforcement Clause18  of the
Amendment, enact remedial legislation. 8 9 Admittedly, the scope
of congressional power under the Enforcement Clause has been
the focus of much debate. 90 Significant authority makes clear,
however, that Congress may use the Clause to enforce or expand
Fourteenth Amendment protections. 19 Therefore, it appears fed-
185 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc'y Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989); see also
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brook, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (noting that state is responsible for
acts of private actors when state, by law, compels act); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,
795 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that state inaction in protecting liberty of one confined to state
mental health facility rises to level of state action).
186 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133 (discussing breadth of Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Robert A. Hillman, Private Motivation, State Action and
the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CoRNELL L. REV.
1053, 1081 (1990) (recognizing "acquiescence or deliberate inaction by state or a state ac-
tor" can also be state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); Tribe, supra note
118, at 298 (stating that certain circumstances warrant congressional regulation of private
conduct). But see United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (com-
menting that no authority supports "novel" approach that state inaction may constitute
state action within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of protecting funda-
mental rights).
187 See Tribe, supra note 118, at 298 (noting that state's inability to resolve problemsjustified congressional intervention to protect constitutional right).
188 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (providing that "Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
189 Tribe, supra note 118, at 296-98 (demonstrating use of Fourteenth Amendment's En-
forcement Clause to regulate private conduct in certain situations when state is unable to
protect constitutional rights).
190 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 35 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting) (urging caution in judicial determinations of congressional enforcement
power validity); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 643, 651 (1966) (discussing Enforcement
Clause use in expanding Equal Protection guarantees); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 233-
34 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that "[c]onvenience and courtesy to the States
suggest a sparing use" of Enforcement Clause); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1239
(1978) (discussing utility of Enforcement Clause in protecting civil rights).
191 See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 (discussing congressional enforcement power to ex-
pand, but not abrogate Fourteenth Amendment rights); Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The
Constitution Outside the Courts, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1287, 1304 (1993) (discussing broad
congressional authority to fashion remedies for contravention of Fourteenth Amendment);
Margot Bodine, Comment, Opening the School-house Door for the Children with AIDS: The
Education for all Handicapped Children's Act, 13 B.C. ENrIL. L. REv. 583, 610 (1986) (dis-
cussing use of Enforcement Clause to broaden Fourteenth Amendment protections).
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eral legislation may be enacted to give effect to both Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process guarantees under authority of the Enforce-
ment Clause.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
cited by Congress as an independent basis for the enactment of
FACE. 192 The Clause forbids state action which denies to "any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."193
The Court has interpreted this clause to require that persons sim-
ilarly situated should be treated equally under the laws.19 4 This
interpretation would seem to require that those seeking reproduc-
tive services be treated differently to claim a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Since all those seeking reproductive services
at a given facility are treated similarly, it appears unlikely that
the Equal Protection Clause will provide adequate authority to
hold FACE constitutional.195 While Congress placed some reli-
ance on the Equal Protection Clause to enact FACE,' 96 it is sub-
mitted that the Due Process Clause would provide stronger
support.
B. Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment also precludes state action which
results in a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 97 The Due Process Clause has been held to mean
that some formal legal process is required before the state may
infringe upon, or deprive an individual of, a constitutional
192 See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 67-68 (proposing Equal Protection Clause as
alternative basis for sustaining FACE).
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
194 See Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 375 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(objecting to Food Stamp Act amendment because it subjected strikers to prejudicial treat-
ment); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (invalidating
ordinance which prejudiced mentally retarded individuals); see also Antonin Scalia, As-
sorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 581, 588 (1989-
90) (stating that "persons similarly situated should be similarly treated" doctrine is funda-
mental principle underlying Equal Protection Clause).
195 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,287 (1990) (citing Cleburne
for proposition that Equal Protection Clause requires similarly situated persons be treated
similarly); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (Equal Protection Clause mandates that similarly
situated people be treated alike).
196 S. REP. No. 117, supra note 133, at 67-688 (relying on Equal Protection Clause as
alternative, independent congressional authority for FACE passage).
197 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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right.' 98 When violence, intimidation and harassment by clinic
protestors prevent individuals from seeking reproductive services,
it results in a deprivation of a constitutional right.'99 Statistics
indicate that the states are unable or unwilling to stop violence
associated with these obstructions.2 ° ° When the state fails to pre-
vent protestors from blocking clinic entrances, a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has occurred.20 As
such, federal regulation 20 2 in accordance with the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment appears justified.2 °3
198 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews decision required
that three factors be considered in Due Process analysis: 1) private interest that will be
affected by official action; 2) risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through proce-
dures used, and probable value of additional or substitute procedures; and 3) government's
interest, including additional burden that additional procedures would entail. Id.; see also
Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (deciding that ten-day
suspension was not "de minimus deprivation of liberty interest," thereby implicating the
Due Process Clause); Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis:
Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (1995) (not-
ing that impeding one's employment implicates Fourteenth Amendment because it de-
prives one of liberty and property interests); Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and
Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 729 (1995) (stating all people's
constitutional rights are protected by due process).
199 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (affirming constitu-
tional right to abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that constitutional
right to abortion exists).
200 See Molly K. Mosley, Torts; Commercial Blockade-Interference with Access to a
Health Care Facility, 26 PAC. L.J. 729 (1995) (commenting on states inability to take effec-
tive action to prevent increasing violence a clinic entrances); Scott-McLaughlin, supra note
167, at 709 (noting that "sheer number of blockaders" often prevented state officials from
keeping clinic entrances clear); see also Amy M. Sneirson, No Place to Hide: Why State and
Federal Enforcement of Stalking Laws May Be the Best Way to Protect Abortion Providers,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 635, 664, n.102 (1995) (reporting that local police refused to arrest "par-
ticularly harassing protestor" who later murdered abortion doctor at same clinic where
complaint was issued). See generally Tribe, supra note 118, at 298 (stating that since states
have been unable to prevent obstruction of clinic entrances or 'private violence against
abortion seekers and providers," Congress should have authority to intervene under Four-
teenth Amendment).
201 See Tribe, supra note 118, at 298 (implying that where state is unable to prevent
purely private conduct that deprives individuals of Fourteenth Amendment rights, state
action requirement is satisfied); Rosenfeld, supra note 198, at 729 (stating that Due Process
Clause protects constitutional rights); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (affirming right to
abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (holding that constitutional right to
privacy encompassed right to abortion). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc.
Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (noting Due Process Clause generally confers no
affirmative duty on state to protects its citizens' life, liberty or property).
202 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting private conduct which interferes with indi-
vidual right to obtain reproductive services).
203 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (opining that Congress has
broad power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782
(1966) (suggesting that Congress may proscribe purely private conduct that violates Four-
teenth Amendment); Tribe, supra note 118, at 295-97 (concluding that Congress has au-
thority under Enforcement Clause to enact legislation protecting Fourteenth Amendment
rights); see also Scott C. Idelman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Lim-
its of Legislative Power, 73 TEx. L. REv. 247, 308 (1994) (noting general understanding that
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CONCLUSION
The Framers arguably intended that the Commerce Clause be
narrowly construed. Early Court decisions, however, evidenced a
slow progression toward a broader application. Judicial approval
of New Deal social legislation further expanded the interpretation
of congressional authority under the clause. This authorization
prompted Congress to rely on the Commerce Clause to enact such
civil rights legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The scope of
the Commerce Clause, however, was diminished by the recent de-
cision in United States v. Lopez. If the Commerce Clause stan-
dard, adopted in Lopez, is applied to statutes that protect civil lib-
erties such as FACE, these liberties may be circumscribed by this
strict interpretation. Further, unless the Court construes the
Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement broadly, it will
not provide protection against individual infringements of civil
liberties, such as private conduct that prevents the exercise of con-
stitutional rights. The present Supreme Court has left Congress
with little authority to enact new civil liberties legislation when it
becomes necessary. Carried to an even greater extreme, it is con-
ceivable that the Lopez standard could eradicate many of the civil
rights advances of the past century.
Anna Kampourakis & Robin C. Tarr
one purpose of Fourteenth Amendment is to expand federal power and circumscribe state
power).
1995]

